Ridley in his book
On Science [1] suggests that there are many types of truth, which those of science stand beside:
the revealed truth of religion; the persuasive truths of the social sciences; the demonstrable truths of mathematics; and the magical truth associated with the humanities.
For the latter-poetry, music, the fine arts etc-uniqueness is the key virtue. In contrast, the scientist focuses on the recurrent, and the repeatable.
'All men by nature desire to know', Aristotle (c 384-322 BC)
Francis Bacon (who we shall look at in a moment) effectively described Aristotle's method of doing science and finding what was true in the following way.
Gather a group of clever people and encourage them to argue. If they are clever enough then the truth must emerge! The Greeks seem to have been the first to propose that Nature is logical. Greek science however, was 'non-instrumental'-they did not carry out experiments. Any evidence they used came from human observation and their conclusions relied upon pure thought/reasoning. They used deduction to establish the truth of the matter. Deduction derives the consequence(s) implicit in premises; e.g., First premise All teachers are mortal Second premise Susan Jones is a teacher Conclusion Susan Jones is mortal Nothing is necessarily assumed about the actual truth or otherwise of the premises-they are assumed to be true for the purposes of argument. There are obvious flaws in this type of reasoning. If you the reader are not a teacher, or like the author of this article, are no longer a teacher, then you might further conclude that you are not mortal, i.e. you must be immortal! The Greek philosopher Zeno came up with other odd conclusions based upon the use of logical deduction, summed up in his so-called paradoxes. Perhaps the most famous concerns a race between Achilles and a tortoise. If Achilles agrees to give the tortoise a head start, then Zeno can prove that Achilles can never win such a race. He argues as follows.
In the time it takes Achilles to get to where the tortoise was at the start of the race, the tortoise will have moved forward. Then, in the time it takes for Achilles to cover this extra distance, the tortoise will have again moved on some more, and so on. The argument can be repeated over and over with the necessary conclusion that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise let alone overtake it and thus win the race. This logical argument offends both our 'common sense' and experience when carrying out the experiment by effectively arranging such a race. Although not as fast as Achilles we could substitute for him. But so strong was the Greeks' attachment to the power of pure reasoning that when logic disagreed with experience, they concluded that their perception of experience must be at fault, because their logic could not be faulted! This position can be summed up as 'mind over matter'.
'Cease to be ruled by dogmas and authorities: look at the world', Roger Bacon (13th century)
To avoid the peculiar conclusions of unbridled reasoning alone Roger Bacon's (not to be confused with his namesake Francis Bacon) succinct command reversed the Greeks' position of 'mind over matter' to become 'matter over mind'. However he still advocated logical deduction as the correct way to reason on the basis of the evidence derived from the world about you. Thus specific consequences (conclusions) were to be inferred from general observations (premises); e.g., (i) All students from (name your own school or college) work very hard at their studies. (ii) Amongst this crowd of young people at a night club this is a student from said school or college. (iii) Therefore this student works very hard at his or her studies.
Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
Francis Bacon is noted for two contributions to our theme. Secondly, when it came to 'thinking' he reversed Roger Bacon's inferring specific consequences (conclusions) from general observations (premises) and observed that all we can reasonably do is to generalize the particular. This is known as induction.
An example of an inductive argument is as follows.
(i) The Sun has risen on every day in recorded history. (ii) Tomorrow is another day. (iii) Therefore the Sun will rise tomorrow.
In other words the fact that the Sun has risen every day so far, and there are no known counterinstances or exceptions, and we have no reason to suspect it will change the way it behaves, implies that it will always rise on every day in the future.
There has been one morning when the Sun did seem to be behaving in a very odd way [2] . It was on 16 July 1945 when a truck driver in New Mexico, USA, reported that he saw the Sun starting to rise at 4 a.m. Then it went down again, and came up an hour later. What the truck driver had unknowingly at the time witnessed was of course the testing of the first nuclear explosion.
There is no logical justification for an inductive leap of faith. Maybe inductive arguments work because they have always worked up to now. This line of reasoning was dubbed the 'scandal of philosophy' by Bertrand Russell, as it sought to justify induction by using induction! So the use of induction is strictly illogical, but this does not necessarily mean it is irrational-just non-rational perhaps.
The outcome of inductive arguments can be just as nonsensical as deductive ones. At the time of writing this article, at every birthday I have had so far I have been less than sixty-four years old. Using an inductive argument I would conclude that I will always be younger than sixty-four. I have proved again that I am immortal! The success of induction as a method of scientific reasoning implies that scientific laws do not vary as time goes by and it is this regularity that is at the heart of being able to make reliable predictions ('the Sun will rise tomorrow') using inductive arguments.
Galileo (born 1554) and Newton (1642 (the year Galileo died) to 1726)
Galileo's name is associated with the crucial importance of the controlled experiment-the 'fair test' beloved of GCSE course work. This is quite a change from simply observing Nature to actively interrogating Nature. Galileo, and, par excellence, Newton, described what was going on in mathematical terms-they devised a mathematical model of the behaviour. Science strives to be precise, unambiguous, logical and universal. Natural language is none of these things; hence scientists have become addicted to mathematics. In passing, this raises two interesting questions: Why should the world be mathematical? And why should our brains be capable of doing mathematics?
Experimentation and mathematical modelling facilitated the explosion in knowledge during the two centuries from 1700 to 1900 AD in which so-called Classical Physics was developed. With the advent of quantum physics on the one hand and relativity theory on the other at the turn of the twentieth century, philosophical problems reasserted themselves once more (although the problem of induction had never really gone away).
'You see how deceptive vocabulary is . . . and how our way of speaking colours our way of thinking' [3] Physics since 1900 has raised many new philosophical questions, not least the problem as to whether there are limits to how much we can know about the Universe in which we live. In 1921 Wittgenstein asserted that there must be something in common between the structure of a sentence and the fact that the sentence asserts.
So for Wittgenstein the limits of thought are the limits of its language, and we can only understand our Universe by exploring what can be said, and what cannot be said, about it. George Orwell in his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (published in 1949) understood the implications of this insight. He realized that if language could change, then previous thoughts could no longer be thought. The whole aim of 'Newspeak' was to narrow the range of thought. In the end the new political order could make political dissent ('thought crime') literally impossible, because there would be no words in which to express it.
Thus different languages imply different knowledge. For the poet Ezra Pound, 'The sum of human wisdom is not contained in any one language, and no single language is capable of expressing all forms and degrees of human comprehension' [4] .
There are more than 6500 different languages around the world today, in other words, 6500 ways of knowing about the world. But according to research being carried out at the London School of Oriental and African Studies Dying Language Research Unit, they are being lost at an average rate of one every two weeks.
Max Born in his textbook Atomic Physics explained why the new quantum physics was so baffling. 'Ultimately the origin of the difficulty lies in the fact (or philosophical principle) that we are compelled to use the words of common language when we describe phenomena; not by logical or mathematical analysis, but by a picture appealing to the imagination. Common language has grown by everyday experiences and can never surpass these limits. Classical physics has restricted itself to the use of concepts of this kind; by analysing visible motion it has developed two ways of representing it by elementary processes; moving particles and waves. No other way of gaining a pictorial description exists, so we have to apply these even in the region of atomic processes where classical physics breaks down' [5] .
So a representation of the world in thought is made possible by logic. However, we do not know whether these (logical) conclusions necessarily represent any actual state of the 'real' world. Thus logic can only describe reality. For example a picture represents reality using certain kinds of symbols. Similarly mathematics. Similarly language. Scientists are trying to describe the world. They try to describe it using some scientific or mathematical language. However, there is a problem about whether what their theories and laws say about the world corresponds to the way the world 'really' is.
Wittgenstein has turned Descartes' famous dictum 'I think; therefore I am' on its head. For Wittgenstein, you only know what you think because of language and language is a public thing that has to be acquired.
Induction avoided; Karl Popper (1902-1994)
There are many apparently successful theories about aspects of our world and the way we live. For example Isaac Newton's theory of gravity, Karl Marx's theory of history and Sigmund Freud's theory of the unconscious all have their committed adherents. All are based (at least in part) on observation. So are they all scientific theories? Karl Popper in his book the Theory of Knowledge [6] argued that the answer was 'no'. To be scientific a theory must be falsifiablei.e. capable of making a prediction that could be tested. For Popper, no amount of data can confirm a hypothesis, but one counter-instance can refute it. Towards the end of the Weimar Republic a pamphlet entitled 100 Authors against Einstein was published. Einstein responded in a very Popperian way-'if I were wrong, then one would have been enough'. Both Marx's and Freud's theories provide an explanation of everything about social change or the unconscious respectively. For Popper, this apparent strength is in fact a fatal weakness. If every aspect of historical change can be given a Marxist interpretation, then we have no way of distinguishing it from any other theory that makes the same claim. A Freudian and a Jungian psychologist can both account for the same facts in their own way. Freud may in fact be right, but we have no way of knowing! Newton's theory of gravitation on the other hand not only accounts for phenomena we are familiar with (e.g. tides), but also made predictions that might or might not have turned out to be the case. For example the orbit of Uranus could not be accounted for in terms of the net effect of the gravitational forces due to the then known planets. The slight discrepancy could be removed if another as yet unknown planet existed to provide just the right gravitational force. Thus the mass and orbit of this hypothetical planet were predicted and the planet we now call Neptune was first observed in 1846, exactly where Newton's theory predicted it should be. Had Neptune not been there, then Newton's theory could not have been the whole story.
Although being testable is a necessary condition for a theory to be scientific, it does not seem in practice to be a sufficient condition. Failed predictions do not automatically lead to the downfall of a theory. In the 1670s it was observed that the eclipsing by the planet Jupiter of its moons seemed to happen at inconsistent times. If their motion was governed by Newton's theory of gravitation then it could not have had the simple inverse square law form which fitted all the evidence up until then.
The discrepancy seemed to depend on whether the Earth was on the same side or the opposite side of the Sun to Jupiter. However, Newton's theory would not need modifying or rejecting if an alternative idea proved to be correct. This was the radical proposal that the inconsistent times were a consequence of light only having a finite speed. The maximum time difference was due to the extra time that light needed to traverse a distance equal to the diameter of the Earth's orbit. In the late 1600s this distance was believed to be 2.77 × 10 11 m. The maximum discrepancy in the timing of the eclipses was 22 min (=1320 s), implying a light speed of 2.77 × 10 11 /1.32 × 10 3 = 2.10 × 10 8 m s −1 (somewhat lower than today's accepted value of 3 × 10 8 m s −1 , due to the poor value for the diameter of the Earth's orbit used at the time). It was over 50 years before this value for the speed of light was corroborated.
In the meantime however, Newton's theory was not rejected (maybe because Newton himself was happy to accept the finite speed of light hypothesis rather than abandon his theory of gravity!). After its discovery, the orbit of Mercury could not quite be accounted for by Newton's theory, but in this case no explanation in terms of a new planet, or an odd shape for the Sun, could account for the discrepancy. No planet could be found, and the Sun's shape was too symmetrical. However, Einstein's general theory of relativity (which is essentially a theory of gravity) did account for Mercury's orbit and for this reason, amongst others, it came to replace Newton's theory of gravity.
Notice that in Popper's view of the development of scientific theories, the problem of induction is irrelevant. He does not rely on arguing from the particular to the general. In Popper's view theories get better and better by an incremental process of dealing successfully with predictions that, had they not been confirmed, might have led to their rejection. But Popper's view also seems consistent with the view that all statements (no matter how wacky) are potentially true until falsified. But then some theories do start out at the time as very odd ideas indeed! Could light possibly travel at 200 million metres per second?
Since 1986 string theory has become the dominant fundamental theory of elementary particle and fundamental forces if measured in terms of the numbers of physicists working on it and the scientific papers they produce. 10 500 is the number of possible string theory solutions, but zero is the number of testable solutions it has come up with so far. A recent editorial in the scientific journal Nature stated 'String theory is far from experimental verification . . . the prime goal must be to turn this project ultimately into testable science' [7] .
Paradigms rule; Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996)
In terms of ideas we have come a long way from Aristotle and the Greeks to where we are now. But it is a blink of an eye in terms of human development. The time span since the Greek civilization is far too short for evolution to make any significant difference to the development of human intelligence. Aristotle clearly was not stupid. He said many things we consider to be perfectly reasonable. So why for example were his ideas about falling bodies so obviously wrong for today's scientists? This thought was the starting point for Thomas Kuhn's thinking that culminated in his celebrated work the Structure of Scientific Revolutions [8] . Kuhn Eventually if too much evidence is accumulated that just does not fit into a prevailing paradigm it will be rejected in favour of a new paradigm. So it is not just one counter-instance that brings down a previously successful theory. The period of searching around for a better theory (i.e. one that accounts for everything the failing theory can explain as well as the things it does not explain) Kuhn calls a period of revolutionary science. The most prominent examples are Einstein's theories of relativity replacing Newton's theory of gravity and laws of motion, or quantum theory superseding the so-called classical physics. The key thing is that the new paradigm is incommensurable with the old. e.g. although both Newton and Einstein talk about mass, they understand quite different things by the concept. For Newton, mass and energy are quite distinct. For Einstein, mass and energy are essentially alike. The debate over string theory visà vis quantum electrodynamics looks like just such an episode of revolutionary science concerning the way we think about elementary particles and fundamental forces. A paradigm change may be on the horizon, if string theory can be developed to the point of being testable.
So the change from old to the new paradigm is a discontinuous 'jump'. Theories do not start small and grow to get better and better for ever.
Are there logical limits to scientific knowledge?
We have seen that Wittgenstein explored the role of language (used to express logical propositions) in what we can learn about the world. Gödel came to realize in 1931 that there are limits to what logic itself can reveal about the world.
His incompleteness theorem is perhaps the most significant result of 20th century logic. It states: in any self-consistent logical system there are statements that can be made which can be neither proved nor disproved within the framework of the system. Thus no logical or mathematical theory can include methods of reasoning strong enough for the proof of its own consistency. Consistent means that you must not be able to prove results that are false, e.g. proving 1 = 2 using the rules of arithmetic.
So any formal system of axioms (i.e. assumptions and rules of procedure) is incapable of proving some truths, and no formal system can prove all truths. For example: given the rules of arithmetic, there are arithmetic statements that you cannot prove or disprove simply using the rules of arithmetic. One example is the Goldbach conjecture that every even number is the sum of two prime numbers. Try it! Every example you chose works, but you cannot prove using the rules of arithmetic that it is true for all prime numbers, no matter how large.
Another example of Gödel's theorem is this linguistic conundrum. Consider the following:
Every man is either a knight or a knave. Knights always tell the truth but knaves never do.
Someone (you do not know if he is a knight or a knave) declares 'You will never believe that I am a knight'.
Is the speaker a knight or a knave? It is impossible to answer this question using the information given.
(i) You cannot believe that he is a knight because he would then always tell the truth, and what he says must be a lie.
(ii) If you believe him to be a knave and thus telling a lie, he is making a statement that you do hold true! (iii) You thus stay undecided, which means that the speaker did tell the truth and was a knight after all-but if he is a knight . . . (back to (i)).
A theory of everything is impossible
Some see the goal of physics as the establishment of a theory of everything (ToE), from which all the rest of physics can in principle be derived. If you assume that a ToE is possible and that it is based on a set of fundamental laws (conservation of energy etc) then Gödel's incompleteness theorem implies that there are new truths to be discovered that will need the discovery of additional fundamental laws for their explanation, so the original theory cannot explain everything.
'We have to know, so we will know' [9]
Can we ever be absolutely certain about something in the physical world? For example, do atoms exist? In effect scientists believe in the existence of atoms-it is part of their shared paradigm. A belief is stronger than pure faith. Sebastian Faulks put the distinction so well in his novel Charlotte Gray '. . . belief (is a) logical conviction, while faith . . . (admits) doubt . . .' [10] . Or to paraphrase slightly the literary critic I A Richards: 'We (accept what) scientists (say) because they can substantiate their remarks, not because they are eloquent and forcible in their enunciation'. We have evolved partly by a process of asking questions and finding answers. Scientific answers have a unique hallmark-they do not represent the absolute truth of the matter. They are provisional beliefs subject to continuous critical revision. For now they represent the most reliable conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the available evidence. Thus science is more a way of thinking than a collection of knowledge. Its real success is not so much in providing answers, but rather in the way these answers can be found or 'how science works'.
